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Abstract
Monotone ratio orderings are reﬁnements of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
that allow monotone comparative statics results in games of incomplete informa-
tion. We develop analogous reﬁnements for second order stochastic dominance
based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio and the unimodal-
ity of the likelihood and probability ratios. We go on to investigate comparative
statics in ﬁrst price auctions, both private and common value, of the eﬀects of
more precise information in the sense of the new orderings. We ﬁnd that almost
all types bid more aggressively under the new distribution than they did under
the old, but the highest types may bid less. This leads to higher expected revenue
in a simple common value auction, but to an ambiguous result in the private value
case.
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Various order relationships between distributions have long been of interest to econo-
mists. Those working in welfare economics rank income or wealth distributions in terms
of inequality or dispersion, and tend to use (generalized) Lorenz order, while those work-
ing on decision making under risk and uncertainty tend to use stochastic dominance
relationships. Stochastic dominance relationships have been also of use in games of in-
complete information. However, even a strong ordering of two random variables - ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance - can be insuﬃcient to ensure unambiguous comparisons in
some games of incomplete information (see, for example, Maskin and Riley, 2000a, foot-
note 14). As a consequence, several strengthenings of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
have been introduced, including the monotone likelihood ratio order used for a wide
class of examples (Athey, 2002) and the monotone probability ratio order (also known
as conditional stochastic dominance or the reverse hazard rate order) used in auctions
(Lebrun, 1998; Maskin and Riley, 2000a).
Though being powerful analytical tools, both monotone orderings are very restric-
tive, ruling out many interesting cases. Being reﬁnements on ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance, they oﬀer no predictions for changes in the distributions that satisfy second
order but not ﬁrst order dominance. Informally speaking, this involves transforma-
tions leading to valuations (or signals, etc.) being “less dispersed” but not necessarily
“higher” than before. There has been little work on the comparative statics arising from
a change in distributions in terms of dispersion. For example, what happens in a game
of incomplete information if the distribution of types is subject to a mean preserving
spread?
With this question in mind, we develop new reﬁnements for second order stochas-
tic dominance based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio and the
unimodality of the likelihood and probability ratios. These new orderings of distribu-
tions allow us to compare distributions of general rather than speciﬁc functional form,
and include some existing orderings (such as conditional stochastic dominance and the
monotone likelihood ratio) as special cases. We go on to investigate how they can be
used for comparative statics in auctions. We show that these orderings are suﬃcient
for some comparative statics predictions in that they imply a single crossing condition,
if not monotonicity. This in turn leads to higher expected revenue in a common value
context, but often to lower revenue with private values. We also show that the compar-
ative statics results obtained under the existing monotone orderings can be considered
as special cases of the comparative statics obtained under unimodality.
Suppose that the group of bidders becomes more homogenous (in a private value
auction), or all bidders get more precise information about the true value of the object
(in a common value auction). Intuitively, one would expect that such decrease in
dispersion of types would lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding - that is, all bidders
bid more aggressively under the new distribution than they did under the old. Yet, we
show that, in ﬁrst price auctions, a reduction in dispersion in the sense of the new
1orderings prompts most types to bid more aggressively, but the highest types may bid
less. This may turn into bad news for the sellers as lower bids by the higher types may
translate into lower expected revenue. We show that this indeed should be of concern
in private value auctions, as expected revenue may not necessary increase with greater
homogeneity of buyers. Surprisingly though, the expected revenue in a simple common
value auction is higher when all bidders have more precise information about the true
value of the object.
The latter result echoes Milgrom (1989, p16), who writes, in the context of auctions
with a common value element, that the Linkage Principle “implies that if the auction-
eer/seller has private information about the item being sold..., then a policy of always
revealing that information increases average receipts”. The Linkage Principle was ﬁrst
d e r i v e di nt h ec o n t e x to fa ﬃliated signals, that is, when the information that the seller
might possess is positively correlated with the signals of the buyers.
The hypothesis that more precise information about the true value of the object
should lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding and higher selling prices has been in-
vestigated in Kagel and Levin (1986) and in subsequent literature for speciﬁc functional
forms of preferences and distributions of signals. More recently, Goeree and Oﬀerman
(1999) investigated the eﬀects of more precise information on the competitive bidding in
a framework that nests both private and common value cases. Yet, the major drawback
of this literature is that providing agents with “more precise information” has been
frequently analyzed by considering two uniform distributions with diﬀerent support.
While being analytically convenient, this assumption is relatively restrictive. We show
that the unimodal ratio orderings could serve as an alternative technique allowing to
analyze more general pairs of distributions.
It is worth reminding that measures of stochastic dominance are not conﬁned to
the economics of information. Since the famous work of Atkinson (1970) they have
also been important in the literature on social welfare and the comparisons of income
distributions (see Lambert (1989) for a survey). However, the ordering more commonly
used in this literature is (generalized) Lorenz dominance, even though it is equivalent
to second order stochastic dominance (Shorrocks, 1983; Kakwani, 1984; Thistle, 1989),
and, thus, both measures can be interpreted in terms of inequality. In this paper, we
add to the result of Ramos et al. (2000) by giving two further (and weaker) suﬃcient
conditions for generalized Lorenz dominance.
More recently, income inequality and games of incomplete information have been
considered together (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2003; Samuelson, forthcoming) in the
context of strategic social interaction, where the question has been whether increasing
equality leads to greater social competition. It is hoped that this paper will be of some
interest to researchers in both ﬁelds as well as in their intersection.
We start with a brief survey of the existing reﬁnements of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance relationships, develop new reﬁnements of second-order stochastic dominance
orderings, and establish relationships among the existing and new orderings (Section 2).
2In Section 3, we use the new reﬁnements to analyze the eﬀect of changes in dispersion
in private and (simple linear) common value auctions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Ratio Orderings of Distributions
In what follows, we consider two distinct non-negative variables ZA and ZB with ﬁnite
means µA and µB respectively, having distribution functions FA and FB, respectively,
with FA and FB both having support [z, ¯ z]w i t h0≤ z < ¯ z. Assume that FA and FB
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the densities fA and fB are strictly positive
on the corresponding supports. We employ the following deﬁnition of unimodality.1
Deﬁnition 1 Af u n c t i o nf(z) is unimodal around ˆ z if f(z) is strictly increasing for
z<ˆ z and f(z) is strictly decreasing for z>ˆ z.
The following order of distributions was ﬁrst introduced by Ramos, Ollero and Sordo
(2000).
Deﬁnition 2 Two distributions FA, FB satisfy the Unimodal Likelihood Ratio (ULR)
order and we write FA ÂULR FB if the likelihood ratio L(z)=fA(z)/fB(z) is unimodal
and E[ZA] ≥ E[ZB]. 2
It is well-known (see, for example, Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988)) that all
logconcave functions are unimodal.3 Thus, if logL(z) is concave and µA ≤ µB,t h e n
FA ÂULR FB.F r o mo u rd e ﬁnition of unimodality, there is a unique value of z which we
denote ˆ zL which maximizes the likelihood ratio L(z), with ˆ zL ≤ ¯ z. If the mode of the
ratio is located at the upper bound, that is, ˆ zL =¯ z, we arrive at a monotone order as
a special case.
Deﬁnition 3 The two distributions FA, FB satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
( M L R )o r d e ra n dw ew r i t eFA ÂMLR FB, if the ratio of their densities L(z) is strictly
increasing.
1This is a slight strengthening of standard deﬁnitions of unimodality - for example, by Dharmad-
hikari and Joag-Dev (1988, Chapter 1) and by An (1998). In the ﬁrst source, a function f(z)i s
unimodal if
R z
z f(t)dt is convex on (z, ˆ z) and concave on (ˆ z,¯ z). In the second, the function f(z)h a st o
satisfy the following: for all δ > 0, the set Dδ = {z ∈ Ω : f(z) ≥ δ} is a convex set in Ω.
2Note that in this deﬁnition, as in a forthcoming deﬁnition of the unimodality of the probability
ratio, we impose the condition on the means so that ZB does not ﬁrst order dominate ZA,a n dt or u l e
out the possibility of the mode at the lower bound.
3For review of logconcave and logconvex functions see Ann (1998).
3Milgrom (1981) introduced the MLR order to the economics of information. More
recently, Athey (2002) employs the MLR order to obtain monotone comparative statics
in games of incomplete information. It is well-known (see, for example, Wolfstetter
(1999, Chapter 4)) that the MLR order implies ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
We now turn to the ratios of distribution functions.
Deﬁnition 4 Two distributions FA, FB satisfy the Unimodal Probability Ratio or-
der and we write FA ÂUPR FB if the ratio of their distribution functions P(z)=
FA(z)/FB(z) is unimodal and E[ZA] ≥ E[ZB].
As in case of the likelihood ratio, if P(z)i sl o g c o n c a v ea n dµA ≤ µB,t h e nFA ÂUPR
FB. Again, denote the unique value of z which maximizes the probability ratio P(z)a s
ˆ zP,w i t hˆ zP ≤ ¯ z. If the mode of the ratio is located at the upper bound, that is, ˆ zP =¯ z,
we arrive at a monotone order as a special case.
Deﬁnition 5 The two distributions FA, FB satisfy the Monotone Probability Ratio
( M P R )o r d e ra n dw ew r i t eFA ÂMPR FB, if the probability ratio P(z) is strictly in-
creasing on (z, ¯ z].















The ratio σ(z) is known as the “reverse hazard rate” in the statistics literature. It
is clear that the inequality (1) holds (for diﬀerentiable distribution functions) if and
only if (2) holds. The MPR order has therefore also been called the reverse hazard
rate order (see, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)). The monotone ratio of
distribution functions was introduced to economics by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) in
the context of decision making under uncertainty, and, independently, by Lebrun (1998)
and Maskin and Riley (2000a) in the ﬁrst price auction literature. Maskin and Riley
(2000a) call their version of the ordering “conditional stochastic dominance”.4 This is
because the MPR order implies that for all x<yin (z, ¯ z], rearranging (1),






=P r ( ZB <x| ZB <y )( 3 )
4Maskin and Riley’s (2000a) deﬁnition is more general, allowing for the possibility of diﬀerent
supports and atoms at the lower bound.
4The MPR order also implies (strict) ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. To see this, note
that FA(¯ z)=FB(¯ z)=1a n dt h er a t i oP(z)i si n c r e a s i n gs ot h a tFA(z) <F B(z)f o ra l l
z ∈ (z, ¯ z). This in turn implies that µA >µ B.
The next proposition shows that the Unimodal Likelihood Ratio order implies the
Unimodal Probability Ratio order.
Proposition 1
FA ÂULR FB ⇒ FA ÂUPR FB (4)
Proof: By assumption ˆ zL =a r g m a xL(z) is unique. We need to show that there exist a






(L(z) − P(z)) (5)
Thus, L(z)a n dP(z) cross at points of internal extremum of P(z), with L(z) crossing
P(z) from above at the internal maximum of P(z)a n df r o mb e l o wa tt h ei n t e r n a l
minimum of P(z). Since L(z) is unimodal, L(z)a n dP(z) cross at most twice, which
we suppose. Denote these points z− and z+,w i t hz− < ˆ zL <z +. This would imply
that the sequence of signs of the diﬀerence L(z) − P(z)i s( −,+,−), so that P(z)
is (decreasing, increasing, decreasing), with a maximum at the boundary z,i n t e r n a l
minimum at z− and internal maximum at z+. However, this can not be true because
P(z)i si n c r e a s i n go n( z, ˆ zL). To see that, apply the second mean value theorem for


























Since L(z) is strictly increasing on (z, ˆ zL), ²<ω implies that P(ω) <L (ω) for all
ω ∈ (z, ˆ zL]. Thus, by (5), P(z)i si n c r e a s i n go n( z, ˆ zL]. That implies that there is at
most one internal maximum of P(z).
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) showed that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio order
implies the Monotone Probability Ratio order. Since the monotone order is a special
case of the unimodal order, we present their result as a corollary.6
5See for example, Theorem 7.2 in Sahoo and Riedel (1998) which say that if f and g are continuous
on [a,b]a n dg is strictly positive on (a,b), then there exists a number ² in (a,b), depending on a and
b such that
R b
a f(t)g(t)dt = g(²(a,b))
R b
a f(t)dt.
6This result had been proved earlier in the statistics literature in terms of the reverse hazard rate
order. The result is one of many in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).
5Corollary 1
FA ÂMLR FB ⇒ FA ÂMPR FB (6)
The proof is straightforward, since P(ω) <L (ω) for all ω ∈ (z, ¯ z]b yt h ei n t e g r a l
mean value theorem. Note that the converse does not hold, and it is easy to construct
pairs of distributions where probability ratio is monotone but the likelihood ratio is not.
Example 1 If fB is uniform on [0,1] and fA =( 4+1 6 z − 9z2)/9,t h er a t i ofA/fB is
not monotone. However, the ratio FA/FB =( 4+8 z − z2)/9 is strictly increasing on
(0,1].
As Milgrom (1981) points out, many well known families of distributions, for ex-
ample, the normal and the exponential satisfy the MLR order. A larger set of families
of distributions satisfy UPR order, including mean preserving spreads. One can easily
verify that, for example, if FA and FB are both normal or both lognormal, with µA ≥ µB
and with σA < σB then FA ÂUPR FB.
We now turn to the relationship between unimodal orderings and second order
stochastic dominance, or, equivalently, generalized Lorenz order.7 We ﬁrst show that
the unimodal probability ratio order implies a single crossing property.
Lemma 1 If FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z) and the maximum of P(z) is interior then FA(z) and
FB(z) are single crossing: there is a unique ˜ z ∈ (z, ¯ z) such that FA(˜ z)=FB(˜ z).
Proof: As P(¯ z)=1a n da sP(z) is unimodal, it must be that P(z) ≤ 1o rFA would
be everywhere greater than FB which would imply E[ZA] <E [ZB]. It reaches a unique
maximum at some point ˆ zP,a n dP(ˆ zP) ≥ 1 ,w i t he q u a l i t yo n l yi fˆ zP =¯ z. Therefore,
if the maximum is interior, that is, ˆ zP < ¯ z, then necessarily there is a unique point
˜ z<ˆ zP such that P(˜ z)=1 .
The next proposition says that if FA(z)a n dFB(z) satisfy the unimodal probabil-
ity ratio order then FA(z) second order stochastically (generalized Lorenz) dominates
FB(z).
Proposition 2
FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) Â2SD FB(z)( 7 )
Proof: Note that FA(z) Â2SD FB,( t h a ti s ,FA(z) second order stochastically dominates
FB(z)) if and only if
R z
z FB(t) − FA(t)dt ≥ 0 for all z.B y L e m m a 1 ,FA(˜ z)=FB(˜ z),
7For the equivalence of second order stochastic dominance and generalized Lorenz dominance, see
Shorrocks (1983), Kakwani (1984) and Thistle (1989).
6FA(z) <F B(z)o n( z, ˜ z)a n dFA(z) >F B(z)o n( ˜ z,¯ z)w i t hz < ˜ z ≤ ¯ z. This implies R z
z FB(t) − FA(t)dt is positive and increasing on [z, ˜ z] and decreases on [˜ z,¯ z] (possibly
empty). So if
R z
z FB(t) − FA(t)dt is negative anywhere it is negative at ¯ z. However,
R ¯ z
z FB(t) − FA(t)dt = µA − µB which is non negative by assumption.
Propositions 1 and 2 together imply the result by Ramos et al. (2000) that Unimodal
Likelihood Ratio (ULR) order implies generalised Lorenz order (or equivalently, second
order stochastic dominance), and that logconcavity of L(z) together with the restriction
on the means implies the generalized Lore n zo r d e r . N o t et h a th e r e ,i nt h eU P Ra n d
MCR orders, we have two new and weaker conditions that are nonetheless suﬃcient for
second order stochastic dominance and the generalised Lorenz order.
We now introduce a further novel reﬁnement of second order stochastic dominance
(2SD).
Deﬁnition 6 The two distributions FA, FB satisfy the Monotone Cumulative Proba-






is strictly increasing on (z, ¯ z).









This ordering has a particular interpretation in terms of ranking the conditional expec-










t h e n ,w eh a v ei m m e d i a t e l y :
Lemma 2 FA ÂMCR FB if and only if hFA(z)=E[ZA|ZA <z ] >E [ZB|ZB <z ]=
hFB(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z).
Proof: This follows directly from inspection of (8) and (9).
The Monotone Cumulative Probability Ratio order implies second order stochastic
dominance as the next Lemma shows.














Figure 1: Solutions to the diﬀerential equation (10) under unimodality of the probability
ratio.
Proof: By deﬁnition, FA second order stochastically dominates FB, if and only if C(z) ≤
1 for all z ∈ [z, ¯ z]. Since C(z) is increasing, we need only establish that C(¯ z) ≤ 1. Notice
that C(¯ z)=( ¯ z −µA)/(¯ z −µB). Lemma 2, together with the continuity of the function
h, implies that E[ZA]=hFA(¯ z) ≥ hFB(¯ z)=E[ZB]. Thus, we have established that
µA ≥ µB,s ot h a tC(¯ z) ≤ 1.
We now will establish that the UPR order implies the MCR order. We ﬁrst consider
a particular form of diﬀerential equation which depends on the reverse hazard ratio
f(z)/F(z). Next Theorem shows that the unimodal ratio order implies single crossing
of corresponding solutio n st oap a r t i c u l a rd i ﬀerential equation. That is, if FA(z) ÂUPR
FB(z), so that FA(z)a n dFB(z) cross at most once at some point ˜ z on the interior of
their support, then the corresponding solutions to the diﬀerential equation will cross no
more than once and only to the right of ˜ z. Moreover, if the solutions cross, they cross
to the right of the maximum of P(z)=FA(z)/FB(z). This possibility is illustrated in
Figure 1.







where ψ1 < 0 and ψ2 > 0.
Suppose xA(z) and xB(z) are solutions to this diﬀerential equation for distributions
8FA(z) and FB(z), respectively. If FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z), then either xA(z) >x B(z) al-
most everywhere, or there exists a point z∗ > argmaxP(z) such that xA(z∗)=xB(z∗),
xA(z) >x B(z) for all z ∈ (z,z∗) and xA(z) <x B(z) for all z ∈ (z∗, ¯ z).
Proof: Denote argmaxP(z)a sˆ zP so that P0(z) > 0f o rz in [z, ˆ zP)a n dP0(z) < 0f o r
z in (ˆ zP, ¯ z]. Examining the diﬀerential equation (10), one can see that if xA and xB
cross at all on the interior of [z, ¯ z], then at such crossing points ψ(xA,z)=ψ(xB,z).
Now, if P0(z) > 0t h e nfA/FA >f B/FB.H e n c e , i f xA(z)=xB(z)o n( z, ˆ zP), then
x0
A(z) >x 0
B(z)a n di fxA(z)=xB(z)o n( ˆ zP, ¯ z)t h e nx0
A(z) <x 0
B(z). Hence, if xA(z)
and xB(z) cross at all on (z, ¯ z), it must be that xA(z) crosses xB(z)a tm o s tt w i c e-
from below to the left of ˆ zP and from above to the right of ˆ z.D e n o t et h e s ep o i n t so f
intersection z+ and z− with z+ < ˆ zP <z −.S i n c exA crosses xB from below at z+ and
from above at z−, so that the sequence of sign of the diﬀerence xA − xB is −,+,−.
Under the boundary conditions to (10), xA(z)e q u a l sxB(z). Then there must exist a
point ˘ z ∈ (z,z +) where the diﬀerence xB − xA is maximized. At this point, the slopes
of xA and xB must be equal, i.e. x0
A(˘ z)=x0
B(˘ z). Since ∂ψ(x,z)/∂x<0w eh a v e
ψ(xA(˘ z), ˘ z) > ψ(xB(˘ z), ˘ z). But this implies that fA(˘ z)/FA(˘ z) <f B(˘ z)/FB(˘ z), which
contradicts P(z) being increasing on [z, ˆ zP). Thus, xA crosses xB at most once, from
above, and to the right of ˆ zP.
We can now use Theorem 1 to link the MCR and the UPR order.
Lemma 4 If FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z), then hFA(z) >h FB(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z).T h u s , i f
FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z) then FA(z) ÂMCR FB(z).
Proof: One can calculate that h0(z)=( z − h(z))f(z)/F(z)o ri no t h e rw o r d s ,h(z)i s
as o l u t i o nt oas p e c i a lc a s eo ft h ed i ﬀerential equation (10). Thus, by Theorem 1, on
(z, ¯ z), hFA(z) is initially greater than hFB(z) and then crosses hFB(z)a tm o s to n c e .B u t
such a crossing is not possible as hFA(¯ z)=µA ≥ µB = hFB(¯ z). Thus, given Lemmas 2
and 3, the UPR order implies the MCR order.
The summary of the relationships between distributions FA(z)a n dFB(z)w i t hµA ≥
µB is presented below (note that the abbreviations “GL”, “1SD” and “2SD” stand for
generalized Lorenz order, ﬁrst order stochastic dominance and second order stochastic
dominance respectively).
FA(z) ÂMLR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) ÂMPR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) Â1SD FB(z)
⇓⇓ ⇓
FA(z) ÂULR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) ÂMCR FB(z) ⇒ FA(z) Â2SD FB(z)
⇑⇑ m
L(z) is logconcave P(z)i s l o g c o n c a v e FA(z) ÂGL FB(z)
93 Application to Comparative Statics for Auctions
In this section we will show how ratio orderings of distributions allow comparative static
predictions in some games of incomplete information, in particular, in symmetric ﬁrst
price auctions.8 In what follows, we consider an auction with n bidders. Each player
has a type zi drawn from a common distribution F(z), which is twice diﬀerentiable with
strictly positive density on its support [z, ¯ z]. All agents have a continuous action space
w h i c hw et a k et ob es o m es u b s e to ft h er e a ll i n ea n ds t r a t e g i e sw i l lt h e r e f o r eb eo ft h e
form xi(zi), a mapping from type to action. The payoﬀ to bidder i from winning the
auction is ui = U(φi(zi,z −i)−xi), where U(·) is an increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, and φi(·) gives the value of the object conditional on winning the auction
(losing bidders are assumed to get zero utility). As Maskin and Riley (2000b) show,
in such a model there will exist a monotone pure strategy equilibrium if preferences
are monotone, i.e. ∂φi/∂zi > 0, bidders are risk averse or risk neutral and types are
independently distributed.
Some work has been done on comparative statics of the bidding behavior by Lebrun
(1998) and Maskin and Riley (2000a), and, for a wider class of examples, by Athey
(2002). For a very general speciﬁcations for the primitives, that is, preferences and the
distributions of types, these researchers derive suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
monotone comparative statics - conditional stochastic dominance and monotonicity of
the likelihood ratio, respectively. In other words, a “higher” distribution of valuations
in a sense of either of the orderings should lead to a uniformly more aggressive bidding.
A result of this sort is given as a corollary below.
Another type of comparative static result has attracted much less attention, though
it potentially has a number of applications. What happens if the distribution of types
becomes less dispersed? For private value auction, this would mean that the group of
bidders becomes more homogenous, while in a private value auction this would represent
all participants receiving more precise information about the value of the object being
auctioned. The obvious hypothesis is that bidding will be more competitive. This is
certainly the case for equilibrium bidding functions calculated for particular functional
forms in Kagel and Levin (1986). However, we show that in general this is not true, even
under quite strong regularity conditions. That is, there are plausible circumstances in
which more precise information will induce some agents to bid less.
In what follows, we consider comparative statics of the bidding behavior and seller’s
expected revenue in symmetric auctions for changes in distributions of types that satisfy
ratio orderings. We consider two particular cases. We start with the independent private
value auctions and turn later to a (linear) common value model.
8Our analysis also can be applied to those other games of incomplete information that can be
solved by the methods developed in the auction literature. These include games of status considered
in Hopkins and Kornienko (2003), oligopoly games with private information about costs and signalling
games with a continuous message space.
103.1 Private Values
The ﬁrst is the independent private value model where the value a bidder places on
the object for sale is simply her type, or φi(zi,z −i)=zi. In this model, the symmetric












The standard boundary condition in the independent private value case is that x(z)=
z.9 Note that if U(·) is strictly increasing and (weakly) concave then ψ1 < 0a n dψ2 > 0.
We show next that the unimodal probability ratio order can be used to obtain
comparative statics for general utility functions. In particular, it implies that more
accurate information will always lead to more aggressive bidding for those with relatively
low signals, and may lead to less aggressive bidding for only those with relatively high
signals. To be more precise, if FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z), so that FA(z)a n dFB(z)c r o s sa t
most once at some point ˜ z on the interior of their support, then the corresponding
bidding functions will cross no more than once and only to the right of ˜ z.M o r e o v e r ,
if the functions cross, they cross to the right of the maximum of P(z)=FA(z)/FB(z).
In other words, equilibrium bidding functions xA(z)a n dxB(z), respectively, behave
exactly like solutions to the diﬀerential equation (10) in Figure 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose xA(z) and xB(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for dis-
tributions FA(z) and FB(z), respectively. If FA(z) ÂUPR FB(z),t h e ne i t h e rxA(z) >
xB(z) almost everywhere, or there exists a point z∗ > argmaxP(z) such that xA(z∗)=
xB(z∗), xA(z) >x B(z) for all z ∈ (z,z∗) and xA(z) <x B(z) for all z ∈ (z∗, ¯ z).
Proof: The proof follows directly from the Proposition 1 by observing that diﬀerential
equation (11) is a special case of diﬀerential equation (10).
Lebrun (1998) and Maskin and Riley (2001a) showed that if the two distributions
satisfy the monotone probability ratio property, one can obtain monotone comparative
statics in asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions. The corollary below is a similar result for
symmetric ﬁrst-price auctions. If the maximum of the ratio is at the upper bound, i.e.
ˆ zP =¯ z, then the ratio is monotone and the proposition implies that the solutions will
not cross.
Corollary 2 Suppose xA(z) and xB(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for dis-
tributions FA(z) and FB(z), respectively. If FA(z) ÂMPR FB(z), then xA(z) >x B(z)
almost everywhere.
9See the appendix of Lebrun (1998).
11Athey (2002) showed that if the two distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property, one can obtain monotone compa r a t i v es t a t i c s .W ea r r i v et ot h i sr e s u l ti n
a corollary below. As the monotone likelihood ratio implies the monotone probability
ratio order, which is the special case of the unimodal probability ratio order, it is not
surprising that the monotone comparative statics one obtains with the MLR order are
a special case of those obtained with UPR.
Corollary 3 Suppose xA(z) and xB(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for dis-
tributions FA(z) and FB(z), respectively. If FA(z) ÂMLR FB(z),t h e nxA(z) >x B(z)
almost everywhere.
The intuition behind the failure of monotonicity disclosed in Proposition 3 can
b ee x p r e s s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt r a d e o ﬀ. As the distribution of types becomes more
compressed, the marginal return to raising one’s bid rises, inducing more aggressive
bidding. However, for those with types above ˜ z, the point of intersection of FA(z)a n d
FB(z), the probability of winning has risen as FA(z) >F B(z)f o rz>˜ z.T h i sh a st h e
opposite eﬀect. Thus monotonicity may fail for some z above ˜ z. One can also remark
that this second eﬀect is increasing with the competitiveness of the auction, that is,
the more risk averse are bidders or the larger the number of participants. This can be
illustrated with an example.
Example 2 Consider a symmetric n-bidder ﬁrst price private value auction. Let FA(z)
be 3z2−2z3 and FB(z)=z both on [0,1] and both having expected values of 1/2. Then,
as FB represents a uniform distribution and FA has a unimodal density, it implies that
FA ÂULR FB, which implies that FA ÂUPR FB. If the bidders are risk-neutral, the
equilibrium bidding functions are xA(z)=z(3z − 4)/(4z − 6) and xB(z)=z/2 for
n =2 . These do not cross on (0,1), but they meet at the boundaries. However, for
three risk neutral bidders, or equivalently if n =2but U(·)=
q
(·),10 the solutions are
xA(z)=2 z(126 − 175z +6 0 z2)/(35(3 − 2z)2) and xB(z)=2 z/3. These cross much as
in Figure 1. Note that ˆ z,t h em a x i m u mo fFA/FB, is equal to 0.75 and the solutions
cross at approximately 0.93.
For the simplest case of risk-neural bidders (that is for linear U(·)), monotone com-
parative statics can be obtained under weaker assumptions on the distribution functions.
In particular, the MCR order on the power transformations of the distribution func-
t i o n si sb o t hn e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient for monotone comparative statics. To see that,







10As Simmons (1996) showed, the equilibrium strategies of risk-neutral n bidders are equivalent to
the ones for 2 bidders with constant relative risk aversion with a parameter 1/(n − 1).
12This solution is well known (see, for example, Krishna (2002, pp17-19)). However, what
is new is that Lemma 2 implies the following.
Corollary 4 Consider a symmetric ﬁrst price auction with n risk neutral bidders. If
xA(z) and xB(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions under FA and FB, respectively,
then xA(z) >x B(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z) if and only if GA ÂMCR GB.
The next question of interest is a comparative analysis of the seller’s expected rev-
enue in equilibrium. Unfortunately, as in Example 2 above, we know that in quite
simple settings the bidding functions can cross.
Example 3 Consider a symmetric ﬁrst price private value auction with n risk neutral
bidders. Take our two distributions from Example 2, where FA ÂUPR FB.U n d e r
the uniform distribution FB, revenue can be evaluated as (n − 1)/(n +1 ) . Under the
unimodal distribution FA, revenue can be calculated as 13/35 > 1/3 for n =2and
2867/5005 < 3/5 for n =4 .T h a t i s , f o r n =2the more concentrated distribution
of valuations gives a higher expected revenue, but for a larger number of bidders, the
uniform distribution gives a higher expected revenue.
This is symptomatic of the following tradeoﬀ. Proposition 3 established that as the
distribution of values or signals becomes less dispersed, individuals bid mostly more
aggressively. This will tend to raise revenue. However, the revenue generated by an
auction is determined by the bid of the buyer with the highest signal. And as the
distribution becomes less dispersed, the tails of the distribution become thinner and
the expected value of the highest signal falls.11 Equally, an agent selling an object by
auction would like to see signals being more dispersed: it may make individual buyers
bid less aggressively but it increases the likelihood of a buyer with a particulary high
signal. Thus, in private value auctions, this competition-likelihood tradeoﬀ results in
an ambiguous eﬀect of a less dispersed distribution of types even for the risk-neutral
case. Yet, as we will see next, common value auctions are diﬀerent.
3.2 Common Values
We now examine the case where the object to be sold has a single common value V
and the buyers are risk neutral and have independent signals drawn from a common
distribution F(z). In the symmetric equilibrium of such an auction the winning bid
comes from the buyer with the highest signal. The insight of Milgrom and Weber
(1982) is that therefore to estimate the value of the object conditional on winning
11Indeed, this eﬀect is familiar from the literature on optimal job search. There, if the distribution of
wages is subject to a mean preserving spread it increases the expected return to search, as it increases
the likelihood of a particularly good oﬀer.
13the auction one has to calculate its expected value conditional on the signals of rival
bidders being lower. Following Milgrom and Weber, we deﬁne the function which gives
the expected value of the object conditional on the signal of the ith bidder and Y1,t h e
highest signal of the other n − 1b i d d e r s ,a sv(z,y)=E[V |Z = z,Y1 = y]. That is, the
expected value of the object conditional on winning the auction is equal to its value
conditional on the highest signal of one’s opponents being equal to one’s own and all
other signals being lower.
Here we assume independent signals, a simpliﬁcation that that has become current
in recent applications. The most common additional simplifying assumption is that the
value V of the object to bidder i is a linear function of his own and the other bidders’
signals, i.e.12
V = αzi + β
X
k6=i
zk for some α,β > 0. (12)
Then the expected value of the object conditional on winning will be v(z,z)=( α +
β)z + β(n − 2)E[Z|Z<z ], or, by (9),
v(z,z)=( α + β)z + β(n − 2)h(z)( 1 3 )
The symmetric equilibrium is given by the solution to the following diﬀerential equation:
dx(z)
dz




with boundary condition x(z)=v(z,z). This diﬀerential equation is derived from
Milgrom and Weber (1982, Section 6).
Suppose now that prior to bidding bidders’ signals are distributed as FB and that the
seller has some information represented by the random variable U. Suppose that seller
releases u, the realization of U, to the public, and denote the new distribution of signals
after the seller’s announcement as FA = F(z|u). We are particularly interested in the
case of the release of the information that decreases the dispersion of the distribution
of signals in a sense of unimodal probability ratio order. For this simple model, we can
achieve an interesting preliminary result. Lemma 2 established that the function h(z)
deﬁned in (9) above, which gives the expected value of a signal conditional on it being
lower than z, is higher under a less dispersed distribution. This in turn means that
v(z,z) will be higher under a less dispersed distribution.13
Lemma 5 Consider the common value which is a linear function of bidders’ signals
as in (12). Let vA and vB be the expected values generated by distributions FA and
FB respectively. Then, for n ≥ 3, vA(z,z) >v B(z,z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z) if and only if
FA ÂMCR FB.
12This form of common value auction is discussed in more detail in Klemperer (1999, Appendix D).
13First, if n =2t h e nv(z,z)=( α + β)z a n di st h u si sn o ta ﬀected by changes in the distribution of
types. Second, if V were a non-linear function of the bidders’ signals, then one would need the MPR
order to ensure a monotone shift in v(z,z). This is because the MPR order implies the inequality (3),
that is, the conditional distribution functions are ordered in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
14Proof: Given the deﬁnition of v(z,z) given in (13), Lemma 2 implies that, if n ≥ 3,
vA(z,z) >v B(z,z)a l m o s te v e r y w h e r ei fa n do n l yi fFA ÂMCR FB.
What implications does this have for equilibrium bidding functions? Using this
Lemma, we can obtain another comparative static result. Just as in the private value
case, agents with low signals, speciﬁcally those with signals less than ˆ zP,t h ep o i n t
where the probability ratio achieves a maximum (see Figure 1), will bid more. Those
with signals above that point, may or may not bid more. The following proposition
s h o w st h a tU P Ro r d e ri m p l i e st h a tt h es o l u t i o n sd on o tc r o s sb e l o wt h em a x i m u mo f
the probability ratio ˆ zP.
Proposition 4 Consider a ﬁrst price common value auction where a single common
value V is a linear function of independent signals given by (12), and suppose xA(z)
and xB(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for distributions F(z) and F(z|u) re-
spectively. If F(z|x) ÂUPR F(z),t h e nxA(z) >x B(z) for all z ∈ (z, ˆ zP].
Proof: From the UPR order, f(z|u)/F(z|u) will be greater than f(z)/F(z)o n( z, ˆ zP).
Furthermore, from Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that vA >v B on (z, ¯ z). Second, one can
calculate that limz→z h(z)=z, so that given our boundary condition xA(z)=xB(z)=
(α + β)z + β(n − 2)z.G i v e nt h ed i ﬀerential equation (14), if xB >x A for all (z, ˘ z)f o r
some ˘ z<ˆ zP,t h e nx0
A >x 0
B on for all (z, ˘ z) which is a contradiction. Thus, it must be
the case that xA >x B for some interval (z,z+). Suppose that the ﬁr s ti n t e r i o rc r o s s i n g
point z+ is in (z, ˆ zP), then again from (14) we have x0
A(z+) >x 0
B(z+)a n ds oxA must
cross from below, which is a contradiction.
So, in a ﬁrst price auction, the eﬀect of more precise information again leads most,
but possibly not all, types to bid more. However, in a second price auction, the result
is stronger.14
Proposition 5 Consider a second price (Vickrey) common value auction where a sin-
gle common value V is a linear function of independent signals given by (12). Then,
revelation of information such that F(z|x) ÂUPR F(z) leads to uniformly higher bids
and higher revenue.
Proof: Note that the optimal bid in a second price auction (Milgrom and Weber (1982))
for an agent with signal z is exactly v(z,z). Let F2(z) be the distribution function
of the second highest order statistic of the distribution F. Then expected revenue
with no information revelation in the second price auction is
R ¯ z
z v(z,z)dF2(z), that
is, the expected bid of the bidder with the second highest signal. Let v(z,z,u)=
(α + β)z + β(n − 2)h(z,F(z|u)). If F(z|x) ÂUPR F(z), by Lemma 5, we have vA =
14Our conjecture is that revenue is higher in ﬁrst price auctions as well as second price, even though
bidding is not uniformly higher. We have not been able to prove this, however.
15v(z,z,u) >v (z,z)=vB for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z). Revenue with information revelation is equal
to
R ¯ z
z v(z,z,x)dF2(z)a n dt h er e s u l tf o l l o w s .
Why is the the eﬀe c to fi n f o r m a t i o no ne x p e c t e dr e v e n u e si nc o m m o nv a l u ea u c t i o n s
quite diﬀerent than in the private value case? In any auction, if information becomes
less dispersed, it is less likely that the highest signal will be particularly high. This
would seem to depress revenue. However, in the common value case, the optimal bid
with such a signal will also depend on the estimate of the expected value of the other
bidders’ signals conditional on their being lower. Since the compression of signals also
raises the expected value of low signals, expected revenue consequently rises.
Note that this result is somewhat diﬀerent from the original results on the eﬀect of
information on revenue due to Milgrom and Weber (1982). Their result was that if the
s e l l e r ’ si n f o r m a t i o nw a sa ﬃliated with the signals of the buyers its release would raise
expected revenue. That is, in eﬀe c ti ti sa nex ante result: before the seller knows what
her information is, she would be better oﬀ committing to release it once it is in her
hands. The result here is ex post: once the seller knows that he has information that
would cause buyers’ estimates to become less dispersed if it were released, he would be
better oﬀ by releasing it. This may seem restrictive. However, take as an example the
standard practice in art and antique auctions of allowing potential buyers to view the
items for sale before the auction. There, the buyer can be reasonably certain that the
ability to examine the diﬀerent lots, and the common knowledge that this facility is
available to all buyers, will reduce uncertainty on the part of buyers. Then, the result
obtained above, suggests that the seller has an active incentive to oﬀer this facility.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we review the existing methods to order distributions and introduce
some new ones. We investigate the implications of these results for comparative statics
in games of incomplete information, in particular, for symmetric ﬁrst price auctions,
with both private and common values. We ﬁnd that more precise information about
the value of the good for sale does not necessarily lead to uniformly more aggressive
bidding. However, in the case of some simple common value auctions, expected revenue
is higher.
We hope also that the stochastic orderings introduced in this paper will ﬁnd wider
use. For example, while we do not investigate asymmetric auctions in this paper, the
orderings we introduce should be useful in determining the eﬀects of one bidder having
more precise information than other bidders. Finally, as Athey (2002) has shown, there
is the potential to use the same methodology to obtain comparative statics in many
other games of incomplete information besides auctions.
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